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Collecting, Storing and Utilising
Information about Improvement Opportunities:
- A Discussion of the Non-Technological Barriers to Success.
Presented at SEKE conference 1999 by
Henrik M. Giæver
http://www.giaever.com
Det Norske Veritas, Veritasveien 1, N-1322 Høvik, Norway.
http://www.dnv.com
Abstract. Total Quality Management (TQM) in various forms has for decades proved successful in improving productivity; continuous improvement and learning being essential tools also in Det Norske Veritas (DNV). Our suggestion for any improvement system is 1) Adjust ambitions to the socio-psychological climate in a unit before embarking on the explicit improvement road. 2) Without the backing of other managers, solutions may create harm rather than improvements 3) In a small unit, sophistication of the information technology will have insignificant effects 4) Align the reward mechanisms closely with what is to be achieved. 5) First analyse information that is collected for other primary purposes; then consider creating supplementing systems. This is based on our experience as a Quality System Advisor and Lead Auditor as well as with the Total Quality Management (TQM) practice of Det Norske Veritas (DNV). An improvement process was created and used for 9 months in a small unit in 1995-1996. No sophisticated technology was used. Many improvements took place in the 9 month period the system was operated, however it is questionable whether the success matched the expense (time, frustration, interpersonal friction, unrest). In this paper we describe the life and death of a small scale experience-database.
1 Introduction
Det Norske Veritas (DNV) is a knowledge intensive organisation that serves the
international marketplace with a broad range risk management services. DNV has
committed itself to TQM as its management philosophy, and is presently also
working to provide the concepts, methods and tools for managing its Intellectual
Capital. With the capability of TQM in producing efficiency and results for
a wide range of very different organisations, and the present awareness of the
importance of knowledge for the survival and success of organisations, there
is a need to reflect on how organisational learning can be accelerated.
Within the framework of TQM and Knowledge Management (KM) it may be tempting
to create costly information systems to record, analyse and take decisions about
non-conformities and other improvement opportunities
In the maritime marketplace DNV has for more than 10 years systematically gathered
information about incidents and accidents with the goal of improving our knowledge
and providing improved services to our customers.
The internal improvement efforts in DNV vary and depend to a great degree on
local initiatives.
In 1995 one unit took various TQM initiatives; a range of learning activities
(courses) were initiated for the team alongside developing a process oriented
and customer focused quality system. In this paper we will concentrate on the
improvementsystem that was created (see figure 1).
2 The improvement system
The unit employed 14 persons involved in development and operational tasks;
primarily serving internal customers.
Each employee was encouraged to identify and report (2) improvement opportunities
(IO) (non-conformities, complaints; anything that could be improved in any way).
Information was also collected directly from customers and via customer feedback
forms that were used in larger deliveries.
The dominant reporting tool was MS e-mail (3). IO's were indiscriminately added
to a MS Word file; open for all (4). Acute problems should be taken care of
immediately, chronic problems should be reviewed by management every three weeks
(6). A point was made of not rushing to conclusions; issues should be considered
as a whole, some of them possibly having a common cause. A particular form was
designed such reported issues could be grouped under one "problem".
One example of an actual "problem": "The standard of our premises"
This was based on a number of observations, e.g. "950622: some of the white-boards
seem dry; how often are they waxed?" "950824: The shelves are messy,
and the standard varies", "950616: It would be beneficial if every
room has a box for stuff that people leave behind", "Week 39: "many
of our clients are unable to find the right room", "951208: We should
all be able to operate the essential technical equipment in the rooms",
"950616 What equipment should actually be in each room? Do we have a clear
standard?".
The consequences of these undesired conditions should be elaborated; "There
will be a waste of time, danger of misunderstandings and dissatisfaction for
all parties involved, and the reputation of the unit and DNV will suffer",
and a problem definition established: "The risk that our premises give
a messy and unprofessional impression is unacceptable".
The form encouraged identification of causes as well as root causes, and the
preparation of an action plan with allocated resources, calendar time and responsible
(7). After implementation of the chosen solution (8), the effect would periodically
be reviewed(9).
Figure 1 The improvement process in a DNV unit 1995-1996 (see gif)
3 Well, how did it go?
In retrospect, substantial improvements were made in the period, and
our customers reported improved satisfaction and increased interest in buying
our services.
After 9 months, other issues in the department demanded the better part of the
attention, the unit merged with another, there was a management reshuffle and
the improvement system quietly died.
It is highly questionable whether the success matched the "expense";
time, frustration, interpersonal friction, unrest.
4 Some Lessons Learned
1. The time needed (calendar as well as man-hours) in
creating, agreeing upon and getting used to the system was considerably underestimated.
2. The attention of the system competes with day-to-day
operation and is uncritically given a lower priority.
3. 9 months proved to be a to short period to create
enduring new habits.
4. The lack of similar initiatives in surrounding environment
made the system vulnerable to organisational changes.
5. The system fuelled insecurity and suspicion if already
present.
6. Such a system requires a rare combination of abstraction
and down-to-earth attitudes in order to work well.
7. "Involvement" and responsibility are far
less sought after bu the employees than "modern" managers like to
think.
8. "Explicit knowledge" (e.g. a statement
in an e-mail or in an open file) has a high potential for misunderstanding and
unproductive conflict.
9. The (lack of) use of information technology had no
impact on the effect of the system.
5 Conclusions and recommendation
Our assistance to other companies in developing or assessing their quality systems
confirms the experience in a unit in DNV. ISO 9001, 4. 13 (non-conformities)
and 4.14 (corrective/ preventive actions) always create questions, tension frustration
and unrest.
That is no reason to take lightly on these topics; together with innovation
and explorative learning they represent a gold-mine for the organisations that
succeeds. The main obstacles are not technical; they are human.
Consider:
1. Adjusting ambitions to the socio-psychological climate
in a unit before embarking on the explicit improvement road.
2. Whether there is support and commitment from higher
management; without their backing solutions may harm more than improve.
3. How to stay in step with the rest of the organisation.
If you want to pioneer; make sure the rest of the team agrees.
4. How well is desirable behaviour rewarded and undesirable
behaviour discouraged?
5. First analysing information that is already collected
for other (primary) purposes. This may be of great value in the chase for improvement
opportunities. Can the existing system be moderated to capture more?
6.
whether the creation of dedicated IT systems
are worth the expense, in a small unit, sophistication of the information technology
will have insignificant effects compared to the other items in this list.
References
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